Tag: <span>IoT</span>

A new IoT malware loader: „privatgodgg.sh”

As usual, it targets ARM-based devices and it tries to download other files (privntpd1, privsshd1, privopenssh1, privbash1, privtftp1, privwget1 etc) via curl or wget (whichever is available on the infected devices). As usual, we suspect this loader to be injected via unauthenticated telnet/hard-coded credentials – although it could be a …

IoT Malware advances

A new strain (as long as December 2016 can be called new) has been spotted on GitHub that combines both a standard telnet scanner and also MIRAI. It has been uploaded here:https://github.com/geo93033/u. In the header(s) you can find some credentials: Xmpp: b1nary@nigge.rs Twitter: @P2PBOTNET Instragram: @Rebirth.c Skype: b1narythag0d and Skype: …

Gr1N – a new malware that also targets IoT devices?

While doing some investigations for one of our clients, we came across a (new) malware strain. After some quick investigations, we found out 2 sources (both in C++, a client and a server). They are signed with: // Client.c Made By @Gr1n1337 – // DeepWeb Fourms User Name – Gr1n …

New IoT Malware? Anime/Kami

During August 2016, we came across several devices that were infected with a new malware that we couldn’t identify – for now. It resides in a read-write partition of some CCTV devices (most partitions on these devices are read-only), in a folder called .anime under the name .kami. It seems the attack used hard-coded telnet credentials and then downloaded the now-unknown malware(or maybe created the file via „echo” commands).

CCTV Malware

We failed to identify it, since it’s truncated – the final file seems to be bigger than the partition it was created on (mounted as /mnt/mtd).

.kami: ERROR: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Renesas SH, version 1 (SYSV), statically linkederror reading (Invalid argument)

The MD5 of it:

cdd887f2112b3d87b96154ca492368a8 .kami

For now, all we can recommend is to move devices from DMZ to proper port-forwarding and, where needed, install a router as a firewall in front of them.

TVT DVRs vulnerable to RCE

According to http://www.kerneronsec.com/2016/02/remote-code-execution-in-cctv-dvrs-of.html, some DVRs manufactured by TVT (and we suspect other IP-enabled devices too) are susceptible to a RCE (Remote-Code-Execution) attack.

In computer security, arbitrary code execution is used to describe an attacker’s ability to execute any commands of the attacker’s choice on a target machine or in a target process. It is commonly used in arbitrary code execution vulnerability to describe a software bug that gives an attacker a way to execute arbitrary code. A program that is designed to exploit such a vulnerability is called an arbitrary code execution exploit. Most of these vulnerabilities allow the execution of machine code and most exploits therefore inject and execute shellcode to give an attacker an easy way to manually run arbitrary commands. The ability to trigger arbitrary code execution from one machine on another (especially via a wide-area network such as the Internet) is often referred to as remote code execution. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrary_code_execution)

What are DVRs and what other devices could be affected?

DVRs stand for „Digital Video Recorder” – the device that’s used to record CCTV cameras. In the same family, we can find NVRs(Network Video Recorders, used to record IP Cameras), IP Cameras, IP SpeedDome Cameras etc. Of course, for the attack to be successful, the devices need to be connected to a LAN and exposed to the Internet and the HTTP(WEB) port must be available (either directly or port-forwarded).

What are the risks?

First of all, unauthorized access to your network. Secondly, the device can be used as a „gateway” to transfer files, data, credentials outside your network. Using this attack, someone can also soft-brick (or-soft destroy) the device, leaving it useless. And, of course, an advanced attacker can even rewrite the embedded firmware with a custom one or repurpose the device.

Vendors/Manufacturers affected?

According to Kerner, devices manufactured by chinese company TVT are all affected (although we do not know, for now, if only some versions are affected). Some vendors relabel (OEM) these devices and, according to Kerner, these are the ones that resell them:
Ademco, ATS Alarmes technolgy and ststems, Area1Protection, Avio, Black Hawk Security, Capture, China security systems, Cocktail Service, Cpsecured, CP PLUS, Digital Eye’z no website, Diote Service & Consulting, DVR Kapta, ELVOX, ET Vision, Extra Eye 4 U, eyemotion, EDS, Fujitron, Full HD 1080p, Gazer, Goldeye, Goldmaster, Grizzly, HD IViewer, Hi-View, Ipcom, IPOX, IR, ISC Illinois Security Cameras, Inc., JFL Alarmes, Lince, LOT, Lux, Lynx Security, Magtec, Meriva Security, Multistar, Navaio, NoVus, Optivision, PARA Vision, Provision-ISR, Q-See, Questek, Retail Solution Inc, RIT Huston .com, ROD Security cameras, Satvision, Sav Technology, Skilleye, Smarteye, Superior Electrial Systems, TechShell, TechSon, Technomate, TecVoz, TeleEye, Tomura, truVue, TVT, Umbrella, United Video Security System, Inc, Universal IT Solutions, US IT Express, U-Spy Store, Ventetian, V-Gurad Security, Vid8, Vtek, Vision Line, Visar, Vodotech.com, Vook, Watchman, Xrplus, Yansi, Zetec, ZoomX


Again, we cannot stress enough the need for stronger security in the IoT World. Including pen-testing the devices, especially ones that have embedded firmware/closed source.